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LAND REFORM IN PERU 
Preface 
This paper analyzes the Peruvian land reform of 1969, a short but dramatic 
chapter in the country's agricultural history. It was short, because most 
of the action took place between 1968 and 1976, i.e. when a group of 
moreless socialist inspired military ruled the country; it was dramatic, 
because it substantially affected the life of a large part of the farming 
population, and had a lasting effect on the entire economy. 
The analysis is limited to the economic effects of the programme : 
production, employment, income distribution, and government finance, all 
issues that in most of the literature are underrated in favour of the 
social and political aspects. 
Public intervention aimed at reducing inequalities in access to land, be it 
the ownership or use of land, has been an acceptable policy for many 
centuries, and goes back as far as the Roman empire. Following the 1917 
Revolution, the Soviet Union redistributed land to individuals and groups 
of people, before, a few years later, .declaring all land public property. 
In the post World War II era, land reform received a renewed interest in 
many countries, not only inspired by the Soviet example (China, Eastern 
Europe, Cuba, Algeria, Ethiopia), but also encouraged by the United States 
(Greece, Taiwan, Egypt, Mexico); under the so-called Alliance for Progress, 
the Kennedy administration gave a strong but short-lived impetus to the 
Latin American countries to provide for a more equitable access to land, an 
impetus which in general received a lukewarm response. 
Peru's landreform was particularly inspired by the yougoslav exemple, and 
aimed at the creation of large, self-governed co-operative production 
structures; on the one hand it refrained from nationalizing the land, on 
the other hand it did not allow a distribution to individual families. This 
choi-ce was not inspired by pragmatic considerations, but rather by the then 
prevailing ideology of the authors of the reform. 
If the reform turned out to be less successful than was hoped for, it was 
this ideological climate, and the measures surrounding the reform, rather 
than logistical or economic problems, that were to blame. 
1 Sectoral background 
1.1. Peru has a total land area of 1.3 m.Km2, lies between the equator and 
latitude 18' south, and its Pacific coastline is nearly 3,000 km long. It 
is a country of extreme contrasts, ranging from the coastal desert strip 
(the Costa) intersected by some 50 river valleys, to the snow-covered peaks 
of the Andean chain (the Sierra) extending, like the coastal desert, the 
total length of the north-south axis, to the Amazonian rain forest (the 
Selva), which makes up the eastern frontier with Colombia and Brazil. As a 
result of the different combinations of soil, rainfall and temperature most 
of the ecological conditions in the world are represented in Peru; this in 
turn makes for a large variety of cultivation possibilities, many of which, 
however, are feasible only in limited areas. 
1.2 Soil classifications show that only 3.5 million ha (i.e. less than 3% 
of the territory) is suitable for intensive crop farming, and that an 
additional 16 million ha (13% of the territory) can be used for extensive 
crop farming, pasture, some tree crops and silviculture. The remainder is 
not suitable for any form of agriculture or silviculture, or only very 
marginally so: some 90% of the Costa, nearly half of the Sierra, and 
virtually all of the largest region, the Selva. So, in relation to its 
population of 21 million (1989), Peru has a limited resource base for 
agriculture, more limited than most other South American countries. Crop 
land per inhabitant is 0.2 ha, compared with an average of 0.5 ha for South 
America and 0.3 ha for Western Europe. 
1.3 Although the Costa makes up only one-third of the country's crop land 
and accounts for only one-quarter of the nation's farming population, it 
produces well over half of the country's gross value of agricultural 
production. This importance results from this region's moderate 
temperatures, availability of irrigation water, infrastructure, and 
proximity to domestic markets and ports. A wide variety of crops is grown, 
such as sugar, cotton, rice, beans, potatoes, and maize. Much of the 
country's development efforts in agriculture have taken place (and continue 
to do so) in this region, some economically justified (such as the 
rehabilitation of salinized valleys), others more of a prestige or 
political nature, such as the irrigation cum energy Majes Project, costing 
over one US$ billion, started in the early 1970's with short-term 
commercial credit and yielding benefits well below expectations. 
1.4 The Selva has been of little agricultural importance so far. This is 
because of poor accessibility and, in the lower, largest part of the Selva, 
to adverse natural conditions. In the sloping part, the so-called Ceja de 
Selva, conditions are considerably better; and with recent improvements in 
accessiblity (the Lima-Amazon corridor and the Carretera Marginal), and the 
economic activity caused by oil exploration, these higher parts of the 
Selva have gained considerable agricultural importance. Timber extraction 
as well as spontaneous and government-organized settlements are advancing 
rapidly, unfortunately without much consideration for the delicate 
ecological balance and erosion hazards. The region is attracting 
considerable domestic and foreign investment. The Ceja de Selva is a major 
producer of coca products (leaves and cocaine). Other products are maize, 
tobacco, beef, tropical fruits, tea and coffee. 
1.5 The Sierra has always been relatively neglected in terms of public 
investment and other agricultural policies such as land reform, price 
policies, research and extension. In terms of area (about two-thirds of the 
country's agricultural land and over half of all crop land) and farming 
population (60% of the national total), the Sierra is by far the most 
important agricultural region. However, because of unfavourable 
topographical and climatic conditions (frost, erratic rainfall, hail, 
prolonged dry season), the Sierra produces only 40% of the country's 
agricultural product. Much of this consists of livestock products (beef, 
mutton, several types of wool, a much reduced quantity of milk) for which 
this region has a comparative advantage ; that is to say that compared with 
the Costa it has fewer disadvantages for livestock than for crops. The 
major crops are potatoes, maize and some traditional Andean crops like the 
grain quinua and the oilseed tarwi, virtually all for consumption by the 
producers. 
1.6 The overall scope for bringing additional land into production is 
limited: some 150,000 ha of salinized land can be rehabilitated in the 
coastal valleys; the exploitation of some areas in the Ceja de Selva could 
become economically feasible if the transport infrastructure were extended; 
however, there is no scope for area expansion in the Sierra. Future 
production growth depends mainly on further intensification; the Sierra in 
particular offers potential, by extending the limited irrigation 
infrastructure, by making better use of existing irrigation facilities, and 
by adopting improved cultural techniques such as improved pasture and 
better seed varieties. However, because of the high transport costs to 
coastal markets, any growth in output of crops in excess of effective local 
demand depresses prices; this would apply less to livestock products 
because of their more favourable value/volume ratio. 
1.7 With an average per capita income of just over US$ 1,000 (1989) Peru 
belongs to what is commonly called the lower middle-income group of Third 
World countries, and the low share of agriculture in its GDP (8% in 1989) 
bears this out. Yet, as many as 27% of its population lives from farming, 
many at no more than subsistence level. Both these percentages have 
continued to decline after 1969, the year in which the land reform that is 
the subject of this study, was started. Although these declining 
percentages do not in themselves necessarily reflect a poor performance by 
the sector, they are part of a wider picture of decline: rural 
under-employment has continued to rise, resulting in a rapid exodus to the 
coastal cities; per capita food production stagnated, leading to increasing 
imports of several basic foodstuffs; exports, particularly of sugar have 
dropped sharply, and, by the early 1980s, made place for imports. A 
positive note concerns livestock production, which has increased, thanks to 
a rapidly expanding poultry industry. Some trends in the sector's 
performance and its place in the economy are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Agriculture in the Peruvian economy 
Agriculture's share in GDP, in % 15 (1970) 8 (1989) 
Agricultural labour force (millions) 2.0 (1970) 2.4 (1980) 
Agr.labour force, as % of total 48 (1970) 27 (1988) 
Agricultural exports (US$ million) 
Agr. exports, as % of total 
Sugar exports (1,000 MT) 
Cotton exports (1,000 MT) 
Food imports (US$ million) 
Food imports, as % of total 
Cereal imports (1,000 MT) 
169 (1970) 
16 (1970) 
403 (1970) 
146 (1970) 
251 (1980) 
7 (1980) 
53 (1980) 
70 (1980) 
108 (1970) 404 (1989) 
19 (1970) 22 (1989) 
560 (1970) 1,065(1989) 
Annual growth rate total GDP, in % 
Annual growth rate agric. GDP, in % 
Annual growth rate total population 
3.9 (1965-80) 0.4 (1980-89) 
1.0 (1965-80) 3.6 (1980-89) 
2.8 (1965-80) 2.3 (1980-89) 
Sources: World Bank, Agricultural Sector Survey of Peru, 1975 
World Bank, Major Development Policy Issues, 1981 
World Bank, World Development Report, 1991 
1.8 Land reform has dominated the Peruvian agricultural scene since the 
late 1960's. Yet, the stagnation in production referred to above can only 
partly be attributed to the inevitable disruptive effects of a massive 
change in ownership and type of enterprise. Factors that were at least as 
important were a) the excessive government intervention in price-setting 
and marketing of agricultural products, and b) the fact that public 
investments in agriculture were spent on large prestigious but economically 
unjustified projects. Price and marketing policies in the 1970s were 
largely a reaction to the previous role of the private sector, which, it 
was argued, had caused inefficiencies and abuse through monopolistic 
practices, this leading to high prices for consumers and low prices for 
producers. Consequently, the Government took over all trade in a number of 
basic foodstuffs, set maximum consumer prices for many more products, 
regulated interregional trade through a system of licences, and introduced 
consumer subsidies on imports of wheat and beef, both luxury goods in Peru. 
Unfortunately, all this led to even more severe inefficiencies and abuses, 
to producer prices that discouraged production even further, and thus to 
growing import needs. 
1.9 The civilian government that came to power in 1980 abandoned most of 
these controls, and re-activated some supporting services such as research 
and extension that had been neglected when most efforts were concentrated 
on the implementation of the land reform programme. For Peru's farmers this 
meant an improvement in their terms of trade, and redressed to some extent 
the strong urban bias of the previous decade. Farm output rose again in the 
early 1980s. But the most urgent problem remains, i.e. how to achieve some 
sustained economic growth for the large Indian population of the Sierra 
(which makes up one-third of the country's total population). As indicated 
earlier, natural and marketing conditions are adverse, while the pressure 
on the land is high, particularly in the Altiplano, Cuzco and Cajamarca 
areas. These conditions have led, and are still leading, to the socially 
disastrous population flow to the shanty towns of Lima (population 2 m. in 
1960, 8m. in 1988) and other coastal towns. All governments have left this 
challenge largely untouched so far, be it for political, ethnic or economic 
reasons. As noted later in this study, the land reform programme, maybe 
perforce, also skirted this problem. 
2. Pre-reform situation 
2.1 Because of the distinct features of the Costa, Sierra and Selva, not 
only in natural conditions, but also in the organization of agricultural 
production, a presentation of Peru's land tenure situation, however 
succinct, has to be in three parts. 
Prior to 1969, about one thousand large plantations (with an average size 
of over 1,000 ha), dominated the scene in the Costa, covering some 
four-fifths of the cultivable land. Operating with permanent and seasonal 
labour they produced sugar, cotton and rice, largely for export. The 
remainder of the land was shared between some 8,000 small and middle-sized 
farms (3-50 ha)and nearly 50,000 farms of less than 3 ha, the latter 
producing either high value crops (fruits and vegetables) if located near 
market centres, or for subsistence. Various forms of sharecropping were a 
common though gradually disappearing phenomenon. 
2.2 Until 1969 Sierra land tenure was characterized by two types of farming 
systems. Some three-quarters of the land was held in the form of vast (up 
to 50,000 ha) "haciendas", owned by corporations or individuals, on which 
most productive work was performed by "colonos"; the latter having a 
personal obligation to work a specified amount of time for the owner, the 
"haciendado", in return for the right to till a subsistence plot or graze 
their own animals on the hacienda, in addition to allocations of estate 
produce or cash. In comparison with a tenant farmer, a colono is much less 
prepared to function as an independent farmer if he is given that 
opportunity by redistribution of ownership. This explains, at least partly, 
why at the time of reform the haciendas were not split up into small units. 
The largest haciendas were ranches (mostly sheep), the smaller ones were 
mixed crop/livestock farms. 
The other major tenure form in the Sierra was, and still is, the peasant 
community (comunidad campesino). Their pasture land is used collectively, 
and their crop land either collectively or individually. Because of 
increasing pressure on land, prior to 1969 there was already a tendency 
towards privatization. It has accelerated since then. 
2.3 In the Selva, land tenure is based on private or government-sponsored 
settlement activities, most of recent date. Until the 1960s, most farming 
was on a subsistence basis, with the family as the production unit, while 
only certain products with a favourable value/volume ratio (for example 
tobacco and beef) were flown out to the Costa; forest products for the 
domestic market were shipped down the Amazon through Brazil to the Atlantic 
Ocean, and then through the Panama Canal to Peru's Pacific ports. 
The completion in the 1970s of two major road connections between the Ceja 
de Selva and the Costa, has resulted in an acceleration of settlement. The 
area also has a handful of government-operated plantations (oil palm) and 
ranches, but the principal crop is coca. A consequence of the colonizations 
is that the original Selva population, who subsist on fishing and hunting, 
are being pushed back. 
2.4 A quantitative picture of the pre-1969 tenure situation can be derived 
from the 1961 agricultural census (Table 2). 
Table 2. Landholding in 1961 
Size of Number of 
holding (ha) holdings ('000) of total 
1 
1-3 
3-10 
10-20 
20-50 
50-100 
100-500 
500 
293 
295 
189 
31 
18 
7 
8 
4 
% 
34.8 
34.8 
22.5 
3.7 
2.1 
0.8 
0.9 
0.4 
Area held 
( '000 ha) 
129 
491 
894 
410 
520 
434 
1,551 
13.295 
% 
of total 
0.7 
2.8 
5.0 
2.3 
2.9 
2.5 
8.8 
75.0 
Total 843 100.0 17,724 
Gini-ratio= 0.9 
Source: Primer Censo Nacional Agropecuario, 1961. 
100.0 
2.5 But these data are of little use, unless one takes into account the 
huge differences in soil productivity. A first attempt to do that was made 
in a 1966 study by the Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola (CIDA). 
This study introduced four categories of economic farm size, related to 
their capacity to support one or more households, and distinguished three 
types of land for the Sierra, two for the Selva and one for the Costa (size 
in ha): 
Costa, irr.crops 
Sierra, irr.crops 
Sierra, non-irr. 
Sierra, pasture 
Low Selva 
Ceja de Selva 
Sub-family-
farm 
3 
3 
10 
100 
20 
10 
Family 
farm 
3-10 
3-10 
10-50 
100-500 
20-100 
10-20 
Medium multi-
family farm 
10-50 
10-100 
50-100 
500-2500 
100-200 
20-100 
Large multi-
family farm 
50+ 
100+ 
100+ 
2500+ 
200+ 
100+ 
The results of applying these standards to the 1961 census figures are 
shown in Table 3. The merit of the exercise is, that it showed that as many 
as 85% of all farms were too small to provide a living, whereas previously 
it was thought that any farm with more than two ha of cropland, i.e. nearly 
half of the total number of farms, would provide an adequate living. But 
the standards applied (and therefore the outcome) are open to criticism: 
By recognizing only one category of land in the Costa, the 
substantial area of rainfed pasture in the northern part is ignored. 
The productivity of irrigated cropland in the Costa is significantly 
higher than in the Sierra; yields are lower in the Sierra and double 
cropping is less feasible. 
The range of what is a family farm seems wide, and the terms "medium" 
and "large" family farms are vague, giving no indications of how many 
households can make a living at what level. 
All this means that the results do not enable valid conclusions to be drawn 
about how many farm families could make an adequate living if there were a 
more equitable distribution of the land. Yet, as the author was told in 
1973 by the then Director General for Land Reform, the CIDA study gave the 
government that came to power in 1968 the inspiration and quantitative 
basis to launch its land reform programme the following year. 
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Table 3. Land distribution by region and farm type, 1961. 
Region and type 
Costa 
Sub-family 
Family 
Medium multi-family 
Large multi-family 
Sierra 
Sub-family 
Family 
Medium multi-family 
Large multi-family 
Peasant communities 
Selva 
Sub-family 
Family 
Medium multi-family 
Large multi-family 
Total 
Sub-family 
Family 
Medium multi-family 
Large multi-family 
Peasant communities 
('000) 
54 
45 
6 
2 
1 
708 
591 
88 
19 
9 
1 
90 
83 
4 
2 
1 
8521' 
719 
98 
23 
11 
1 
Farms 
% 
100 
83 
11 
4 
2 
100 
83 
13 
3 
1 
-
100 
93 
4 
2 
1 
100 
84 
12 
3 
1 
-
Area 
('000 ha) 
1,295 
129 
52 
78 
1,036 
15,260 
722 
724 
760 
11,450 
1,604 
2,050 
273 
100 
168 
1,509 
18,605l> 
1,124 
876 
1,006 
13,995 
1,604 
% 
100 
10 
4 
6 
80 
100 
5 
5 
5 
75 
10 
100 
13 
5 
8 
74 
100 
6 
5 
5 
75 
9 
Average 
size (ha) 
1 
1 
1. 
2 
1 
1, 
24 
3 
8 
39 
,126 
22 
1 
8 
40 
,284 
,985 
23 
3 
27 
78 
,406 
22 
2 
9 
43 
,338 
,985 
1) Totals differ from those in Table 2. The above table is based on 
preliminary census results. 
Source: Comité Interamericano de Desarrollo Agricola, Tenencia de la Tierra y Desarrollo 
Socio-Económica del Sector Agricola, Peru, 1966. 
Figures rounded by author. 
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2.6 If one accepts the CIDA standard for what was considered to be the 
minimum for a family farm and apply it to the regional land inventory made 
on the basis of the 1972 census (comparable figures were not available from 
the 1961 census), it appears that the Costa could support a maximum of 
about 250,000 family farms, the Sierra a maximum of nearly 500,000 and the 
Selva nearly 100,000 families, thus giving a total of nearly 850,000 
families. Yet, according to the 1972 census the total number of 
agriculture-dependent families was in the order of 1.0 m., of which about 
150,000 were in the Costa, same 100,000 were in the Selva, but as many as 
750,000 were in the Sierra. The lower overall pressure on land in the Costa 
may explain why the reform set the maximum area of individually owned 
irrigated land at 50 ha, but in the Sierra at only 15 ha. 
2.7 Another, and more realistic attempt to make the different categories of 
agricultural land comparable, was published in 1980 (Caballero and 
Alvarez), shortly after the land reform programme had been officially 
declared terminated. This study, which intended to measure the effective 
scope of the redistribution of land, proposed the following weighting 
factors to standardize different categories of land: 
Irrigated cropland: 
Rainfed cropland: 
Natural pastures 
Marginal lands 
Costa 
Sierra 
Selva 
Costa 
Sierra 
Selva 
All regions 
All regions 
1.0 
0.53 
0.62 
0.25 
0.25 
0.30 
0.01 
0.0 
2.8 Using data from the 1972 census, Tables 4.A and 4.B show the regional 
distribution of the three categories of land, with and without 
standardizing the data. The difference between these tables gives rise to 
the following observations : 
Standardizing the data results in the a priori vastness of Peru's 
agricultural land resources being reduced to one-tenth of what they 
seemingly are. While the need to take differences in land quality into 
account is obvious, this outcome may nevertheless be surprisingly low. 
Similarly, the limited area under irrigation represents over half of 
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land resources, whereas the vast, seemingly empty areas of Sierra pastures 
are reduced to an asset of marginal proportions. In this way the small 
agricultural area of the Costa is seen to be nearly as important as the 
Sierra. The weighting factors used may still be the conservative side, 
as the value of coastal farm production is estimated to be about half 
of the national total. 
The average area of land available per farm family works out as being 
the equivalent of 1.6 ha of irrigated cropland. In relation to the farm 
population this is a low figure, at least if one accepts that 3 ha is the 
acceptable minimum, as in the CIDA study. (The Government set an 
acceptable minimum of 3.5 ha for the Costa in the course of the reform 
process.) But it is not low compared with Egypt or South Asian countries. 
Anyway, to satisfy the minimum requirement for all farm families would have 
required nearly twice the available land resources or a much larger 
irrigated area (for which the potential exists, particularly in 
the Sierra); or, for that matter, a much smaller farm population. 
Using the regional population figures estimated in paragraph 2.6, the 
imbalance for the Sierra is most striking: this region would be able to 
properly accommodate only one-third of its farming population. On the other 
hand, in the Costa a strictly equitable land distribution would 
theoretically have been possible. The Selva occupies an intermediate 
position. 
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Table 4A. Unstandardized data on regional distribution of major categories 
of land (1972; in 1,000 ha) 
Costa Sierra Selva Peru 
ha % ha % ha % ha % 
Irr. cropland 744 4.0 491 2.6 38 0.2 1,273 6.8 
Rainfed cropl. 62 0.3 1,789 9.5 567 3.0 2,418 12.8 
Natural pasture 496 2.6 14.301 76.0 332 1.8 15.129 80.4 
Total 1,302 6.9 16,581 88.1 937 5.0 18,820 100.0 
Table 4B. Standardized data on regional distribution of major 
categories of land (1972; in 1,000 ha) 
Costa Sierra Selva Peru 
ha % ha % ha % ha % 
Irr. cropland 744 41.1 259 14.3 24 1.3 1,027 56.7 
Rainfed cropl. 16 0.8 447 24.7 167 9.2 630 34.7 
Natural pasture 5 0.3 147 8.1 3 0.2 155 8.6 
Total 765 42.2 853 47.1 194 10.7 1,812 100.0 
Source: J.M. Caballero and E. Alvarez, Aspectos Cuantitativos de la Reforma 
Agraria, Lima, 1980. 
2.9 Earlier governments, pushed by the pressure of outbursts of unrest in 
parts of the country, had paid some lip-service to the agrarian question, 
but had not been aware of the magnitude of the problem in relation to the 
scope for a solution. On the eve of the 1969 reform it had become clear to 
the authorities that the available resources would fall short of what was 
needed. However, the picture was even gloomier than they thought. This may 
be one reason why the ensuing land reform fell short of expectations. 
Other, probably more important factors were that a)the reform precluded any 
movement of reform beneficiaries from one region to the other, or even 
within regions and b) the concepts underlying the production structures 
created under the reform turned out to cause more problems than they 
solved. The latter point will be elaborated upon in the following chapters. 
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3. Land reform 
3.1 The first claims for land reform in Peru date from 1924, in the 
programme of the then newly established political party APRA. In the 1931 
presidential campaign its leaders fulminated against "the sugar and cotton 
barons". This platform appealed to the workers of the agricultural 
entreprises in the Costa; but it took until the 1956 election, when the 
successful 1952 revolution in Bolivia threatened to spread to the Peruvian 
Sierra, for all major parties to advocate some form of land reform. After 
the election nothing happened, except for the installation of a commission 
to study the matter, followed in 1959 by the setting up of the Agrarian 
Reform and Settlement Agency. Pushed by continued unrest in the Sierra, the 
agency drafted an innocuous reform bill, which, however, was never 
considered by Parliament. It should be noted here that participation in 
elections was constitutionally restricted to those able to read and write; 
this excluded virtually all of the Sierra and Selva population. 
3.2 In the meantime, events in the Sierra had followed each other at an 
accelerated pace: in the early 1950s the first labour unions of colonos 
appeared, to protest against the demands for free colono labour by the 
haciendados; the movement spread to several Sierra departments. In 1959, a 
since then famous (or notorious) labour organizer, Hugo Blanco, joined the 
movement, of which he soon became the leader. A general strike was called 
in several parts of the Sierra at the end of 1961, and early 1962 a decree 
was issued abolishing unpaid labour obligations. Successful in this area, 
the unions proceeded to occupy hacienda lands. Despite severe clashes with 
the police and army dozens of invasions followed, until in 1963 the newly 
elected president, Belaunde, accused of tolerating rural anarchy, undertook 
three actions : by condoning a few small invasions he took the first 
concrete land reform actions, albeit on an ad hoc basis ; he took harsh 
measures against other invasions; and in 1964 he promulgated a land reform 
law, which, incidentally, excluded squatters as potential beneficiaries. 
This law, which was much weaker than the president's original proposal, was 
detailed and comprehensive, but the provisions were so complex, the 
exclusions so numerous, and the compensation to landowners so generous, 
that implementation was extremely cumbersome and costly. Other problems 
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were intra-government rivalry, and fierce opposition by APRA leaders who 
feared that an effective reform would rob them of the support of the 
coastal estate worker's unions. All in all, between 1964 and 1969, only 4% 
of eligible land was redistributed. 
3.3 Despite the fact that little land was redistributed, the 1964 law had a 
significant impact, inasmuch as it not only raised expectations among the 
peasants but also convinced landowners that expropriation would sooner or 
later be inevitable. The latter's reaction was therefore to "extract the 
maximum possible surplus" (quotation from the records of a Cajamarca 
estate), to decapitalize their farms, and to transfer their assets out of 
agriculture. In some cases, haciendas were sold to surrounding communities, 
but more often landowners continued operations while trying to replace 
colonos by hired labour, in the hope of avoiding future conflicts over 
rights to cropland and pastures. 
3.4 Concerned about falling agricultural production, continued peasant 
unrest, the unfulfilled promises of the Belaunde government (also in 
domains other than agriculture) and the prospect of APRA, who was now 
siding openly with the landowners, winning the next elections, the army 
took over power at the end of 1968. Among the structural reforms announced, 
land reform took a prominent place. In June 1969 a new law was issued 
(Decreto-Ley no. 17716). 
3.5 The 1969 law was in all respects more radical than its predecessor, 
except for the maximum areas that could, in principle, be retained by 
individual owners. Table 5 shows its principal quantitative provisions. 
Some further aspects are worth mentioning: 
- From the start the law was vigorously implemented by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, often at the expense of its regular tasks 
- A special branch of the judiciary was created to deal with the legal 
issues 
- All forms of land rental and absenteeism were prohibited; individual 
owners were to reside on and work their property directly 
- The law required all workers (in practice only the permanent workers) to 
participate in the profits and management of the entreprise 
- The country's 13 large sugar estates, exempted from the 1964 law, were 
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also included 
- The central element of the law was to be the associative production 
structure, characterized by collective ownership and self-management, 
following the Yugoslav model 
- The large-scale production cooperative was seen by the government as the 
ideal production unit, combining technical-economic efficiency with the 
social-political advantages of self-management; to this end, and possibly 
also to economize on scarce management expertise, neighbouring expropriated 
estates were grouped into a single associative entreprise; this also 
explains why virtually no expropriated land was allocated to individuals 
- After heated discussions within the government, it was decided that the 
state was not to become involved in the management of the new entreprises, 
but was to limit itself to extending management training, credit, and other 
services. 
3.6 Contrary to the previous law, which had numerous clauses exempting 
land, that was in principle expropriable, the new law cited some 30 
conditions for land to be expropriated, even if the land did not a priori 
fall under the law. As these conditions, which related to such things as 
inadequate land use and improper labour practices, were not clearly 
defined, they caused great uncertainty among the owners. 
3.7 The approaches outlined above were supported by slogans like "creating 
the new Peruvian" and "promoting a society that is neither capitalist nor 
communist", and by setting up a nationwide agency for "social 
mobilization". Obviously, the ideological base of this military government 
was quite different from that of most military governments in Latin 
America. Neither was it inspired by events in Cuba and Chile, but rather by 
admiration for what at that time was looked upon by many as the ideal 
production structures in Maoist China and Yugoslavia. 
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Table 5: Main quantitative provisions of the 1969 reform law 
A Maximum area of land retainable 
a. Individually owned 
-Coastal cropland 
-Coastal non-irrigated pastures 
-Sierra and Selva irrigated land1' 
-Sierra and Selva non-irr .land11 
b. Owned by corporations 
B Causes for further expropriation 
150 ha 
3,000 ha 
15-55ha, according to 
province 
sufficient to sustain 5,000 
sheep, or equivalent 
total area expropriable 
32 conditions, of which the 
principal ones related to 
inadequate land use, 
illegal labour conditions, 
social conflicts, pressing 
need for land. 
C Valuation for compensation 
a. Land 
b. Other fixed assets 
c. Livestock 
based on self-assessed 
values of 1968 tax returns 
book value 
market value 
b. Maximum cash for other assets 
c. Bonds characteristics 
D Form of compensation 
a. Maximum cash payment for land S/.25,000/farm2), if 
cultivated by tenant; 
S/.50,000/farm, if 
inefficiently owner-
operated 
S/.100,000/farm, if 
efficiently owner-operated 
up to S/.lm. 
20 year at 6%, 25 year at 
5%, 30 year at 4%, according 
to efficiency of cultivation; 
non-negotiable, but may be redeemed if 
proceeds, accompanied by cash equivalent, 
are invested in specified 
industrial activities. 
1) After a few years it was decided to stop applying the law to the Selva 
2) US$1 = Soles 39 (1969-74); US$1 = S/.290 (1980); US$1 = S/.2000 (mid 1984) 
Source: Adapted from T. Carroll, in U.S.A.I.D. Spring Review,1970. 
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3.8 The reform's objectives were twofold: 
- to arrive at a more equitable distribution of agricultural resources 
- to restore growth of agricultural production. 
The quantitative targets initially caused some confusion', the Ministry of 
Agriculture had calculated an expropriable area of 9 m. ha (of which 2.1 m. 
ha was cropland, and 6.9 m. ha was pasture), while the Agrarian University, 
to whom part of the preparatory work was entrusted, arrived at a figure of 
14.8 m. The disparity was because of uncertainty about the applicability of 
the 30-odd provisions referred to above. A compromise of 12 m. ha was 
officially accepted at the outset, to be redistributed by the end of 1976 
among 342,000 beneficiaries. After a mid-term evaluation in 1973, the 
target was lowered to 10.2 m. ha, to be achieved by the end of 1978; after 
a change of government in 1976, it was lowered again, to 9.5 m. ha, i.e. 
about half of all agricultural land. 
3.9 Land was to be transferred to a) Agrarian Production Cooperatives 
(Cooperativas Agrarias de Producción, CAP), b) Agrarian Social Interest 
Societies (Sociedades Agricolas de Interés Social, SAIS), c) peasant 
communities (Comunidades Campesinos), and d) individuals. The CAPs and 
SAISs were to receive priority, as witnessed by the following figures 
representing the original target: 
Beneficiary % of redistributed area % of beneficiaries 
CAPs 42 52 
SAISs 39 13 
Communities 15 17 
Individuals _4 18 
Total 100 100 
(= 12 m. ha) (= 342,000) 
A CAP had as its principal characteristics that it was collectively owned 
by the full-time workers; although in most cases a professional manager was 
hired, final management decisions were taken by a general assembly. No 
individual production was permitted, and rules were set for profit 
distribution. The minimum size was to be 15 times the officially endorsed 
Agricultural Family Unit (3.5 ha in the Costa, 10 ha in the Sierra). 
However, the most common size became 400-800 ha, comprising 100-200 
families, and much larger in the 15 sugar producing CAPs and the few CAPs 
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involved in livestock production. The larger size reduced the coherence of 
the membership, in particular when several smaller estates were grouped 
into a single CAP. This resulted in conflicts, refusal to engage any 
professional management, and, after a few years, to frequent cases of 
splitting up into smaller units, sometimes to the minimum allowable of 15 
families. 
3.10 Whereas virtually all CAPs were to be found in the Costa, (a notable 
exception was the huge CAP formed in Anta, near Cuzco, consisting of 36,000 
ha and 44 former estates), the SAISs were created in the Sierra. The SAIS 
is a complex cooperative-like enterprise, established where haciendas are 
surrounded by peasant communities. The idea was to preserve the efficiency 
of a large livestock operation, and to distribute its profits among the 
communities, in order to reduce threats of land invasions and to promote 
the communities' development. The SAIS is owned and managed by workers of 
the expropriated estate (the central production unit) and by a number of 
communities. Members of the communities participate in management and share 
in the profits of the central production unit, itself operating as a 
production cooperative, but do not share in the work. In the Delegate 
Assembly of the SAIS each community would have one vote, and the production 
unit would also have one vote. The workers of the production unit would not 
be keen to see possible profits be disbursed to the communities, whereas 
for the latter these profits would be the only possible advantage of 
belonging to a SAIS; consequently, there was a built-in conflict from the 
start. The first 30 SAISs in operation by the end of 1973 ranged from 3,000 
ha, comprising 60 families, to 300,000 ha, with 4,000 families. In 1974, a 
new form of SAIS was introduced, the Social Property Entreprise (Empresa de 
Propriedad Social, EPS). EPSs were established in several sectors of the 
economy, including in the Sierra livestock sector. But they gained only 
minor importance in this sector. 
3.11 Yet another type of entity established by the reform was the Peasant 
Community. In the sense of the law this was an association of families, 
collectively owning a specific area and bound together by communal labour 
and mutual aid; in other words the ideal, or rather idealistic, image the 
authorities had of the communities in the Sierra. In reality, privatization 
of land and work already existed in varying degrees in most communities. To 
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benefit from the land reform and qualify as a Peasant Community, a 
community had to adopt the cooperative production system. As there was 
strong opposition, there was not much land transferred to this type of 
beneficiary. 
3.12 Another idea that met with mixed success was the Central Cooperative. 
These were to comprise a number of CAPs or SAISs, either on a regional or 
on a product basis. Among the few that were set up, the Central of Sugar 
Cooperatives operated well for some time, but others were still-born. The 
government saw these second level cooperatives (or, in the case of SAISs, 
third level) as potential vehicles for its agricultural policies. 
3.13 As indicated earlier, the reform was rigorously implemented, in 
particular in the period 1970-73. Priority was given to the northern Costa 
and the Central and Southern Sierra where the largest estates and haciendas 
existed. By mid-1973 nearly half of the envisaged 9,700 properties had been 
expropriated, and nearly a quarter of expropriable livestock. Of the land 
acquired, three-quarters (or 4,0 m. ha) had been allotted, CAPs and SAISs 
each receiving nearly 40%. 
Much slower was the issuance of declarations of exemption to small and 
medium-sized owners; declarations that gave some shelter against any of the 
32 conditions for expropriation that could be (and were) arbitrarily 
interpreted. The continued uncertainty among this group, was reflected by 
sharply dropping production, and from mid-1973 the issuance was speeded up 
to several thousand per month. 
3.14 After a change in military government in 1975 the attitude towards the 
reform changed. By that time nearly 80% of the in 1972 adjusted target of 
10.2 m. ha had changed hands (70% if one deducts the 1.1 m. ha of "marginal 
lands", a category that was not originally envisaged). From there on, the 
process of expropriation and assignation slowed down: there was more 
sympathy for individual owners, court appeals by expropriated owners were 
more often than not decided in their favour, and in a few cases original 
decisions were reversed. In 1979 the reform was officially declared 
terminated. Since then the land tenure situation has not significantly 
changed. 
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3.15 Tables 6A and 6B show the redistributed areas as per September 1979 
according to type of land and region. Table 6A presents the actual areas, 
while in Table 6B these areas have been standardized using the conversion 
factors presented in paragraph 2.7. A comparison between the two tables 
shows what could be expected, i.e. that in sheer area the reform was most 
spectacular in the Sierra; but if one takes into account land productivity, 
the greatest effect was in the Costa. 
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Table 6A. Unstandardized data on redistributed area, by region and major 
category of land (1979; in 1,000 ha) 
Irrigated cropland 
Rainfed cropland 
Natural pastures 
Marginal lands 
Total 
Costa 
ha 
398 
36 
406 
219 
1,059 
% 
4.8 
0.4 
4.9 
2.6 
12.8 
5 
6 
Sierra 
ha 
113 
539 
,429 
828 
,909 
% 
1.4 
6.5 
65.4 
10.0 
83.3 
Se 
ha 
1 
132 
155 
40 
328 
Iva 
% 
0.0 
1.6 
1.9 
0.5 
4.0 
5 
1 
8 
Peru 
ha 
512 
707 
,990 
.087 
,296 
% 
6.2 
8.2 
72.2 
13.1 
100.0 
Table 6B. Standardized data on redistributed area, by region and major 
category of land (1979; in 1,000 ha) 
Irrigated cropland 
Rainfed cropland 
Natural pastures 
Marginal lands 
Total 
Costa 
ha 
398 
9 
4 
, 
411 
% 
56.7 
1.3 
0.6 
_ 
58.5 
Sierra 
ha 
59 
135 
56 
_ 
250 
% 
8.5 
19.2 
7.9 
_ 
35.6 
Sel 
ha 
1 
39 
2 
_ 
41 
va 
% 
0.1 
5.5 
0.2 
_ 
5.9 
Peru 
ha 
458 
183 
62 
_ 
702 
% 
65.2 
26.0 
8.8 
_ 
100.0 
Source: J.M. Caballero and E. Alvares, op.cit. 
3.16 To measure the relative importance of the reform in the three regions, 
a comparison between Tables 4A and 6A, and between Tables 4B and 6B is 
called for. In Table 7 the areas affected by the reform are expressed in 
precentages of available land, again per region and major category of land. 
It appears then that the proportion of land affected by the reform was 
nearly twice as high in the Costa as in the Sierra, and more than twice as 
high as in the agriculturally less important Selva; this can be explained 
by the higher concentration of land in large holdings in the Costa. It is 
also clear that, in standardized terms, the scope of the reform is 
considerably lower in the individual regions than the unstandardized data 
suggest: this is because per region relatively more of the land of poorer 
quality was redistributed. This does not apply to the data for the country 
as a whole: both in unstandardized and in standardized terms the reform 
affected nearly 40% of all agricultural land, ranging from nearly 30% of 
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Costa 
54 
58 
82 
65 
54 
Sierra 
23 
30 
38 
37 
29 
Selva 
3 
23 
47 
31 
21 
Peru 
40 
29 
40 
38 
39 
rainfed cropland to 40% of irrigated cropland and natural pastures. 
Table 7. Relative importance of the reform (in % of total available 
area in each category) 
Irrigated cropland 
Rainfed cropland 
Natural pastures 
Total unstandardized 
Total standardized 
1) Excluding marginal lands; availability as indicated by 1972 census. 
Sources: Tables 4A and B, and Tables 6A and B 
3.17 Even though the lion's share of the 8.3 m. ha of redistributed land 
has been allocated to the various newly created types of associative 
production units, the amount is less than was initially intended. The CAPs 
and the Peasant Communities in particlar received much less in sheer areal 
terms, than originally proposed (see paragraph 3.9). Although only 4% was 
intended to be allocated to individuals, their share ended up being a 
quarter of the total, probably as a result of the attention they received 
in the last years of the reform. Caballero and Alvarez, from whose study 
these data are drawn, distinguish between two types of individual 
beneficiaries: "individuales", being small coastal market-oriented 
producers, and "campesinos", subsistence peasants in the Sierra, formerly 
"colonos" on haciendas. Table 8 shows the distribution by type of 
beneficiary both in unstandardized and standardized terms. Obviously, when 
expressed in standardized hectares, the share of the typical coastal 
beneficiaries, the CAPs and the individual commercial producers, becomes 
much larger, and that of the typical Sierra beneficiaries, the SAISs 
(including EPSs), Peasant Communities and "campesinos" much smaller. 
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Table 8. Allocation of redistributed land by category of beneficiary 
(in percentages) 
CAP (600) 
SAIS (60) 
EPS (13) 
Peasant Communi 
Sub-total 
Campesinos 
Individuals 
Others 
Sub-total 
ty 
Unstandardized 
26.1 
34.7 
3.1 
10.5 
74.4 
21.0 
4.3 
0.3 
25.6 
Standardized 
51.8 
11.9 
1.5 
7.7 
72.9 
14.5 
12.6 
0.0 
27.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
(= 8.3 m. ha) (- 0.7 m. ha) 
Source: Caballero and Alvarez, op.cit. 
3.18 The number of families that would benefit from the reform was 
initially estimated at 340,000 (cf. paragraph 3.9). The ex-post estimate is 
somewhat higher: 360,000. However, the definition of who is a beneficiary, 
and who is not, is important. At some stage the authorities considered even 
the recipients of exemption certificates as being beneficiaries too, but 
this notion was later abandoned. In the 360,000 families mentioned, five 
categories should be distinguished: 
a) the former permanent workers from the expropriated estates: if they 
belong to a CAP they are co-owners of the land and other assets; if they 
belong to a SAIS they are also co-owners, but officially share their newly 
acquired property with the surrounding communities. 
b) the members of the officially recognized Peasant Communities: they are 
also co-owners of the land, although they mostly work it individually. 
c) the "individuals", mostly people who were previously renting their land, 
largely in the Costa and the Selva. 
d) the "campesinos", former "colonos" who worked on the haciendas in 
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exchange for the use of a subsistence plot; they became individual owners 
of that plot. 
e) members of communities surrounding a SAIS: as explained earlier, they 
did not acquire land, but only the benefit of possible profits, distributed 
by the SAIS in the form of a productive investment; hardly any profits were 
ever distributed. 
3.19 Table 8 shows the importance of each category and the average area 
attributed per beneficiary family. Unfortunately the data do not permit a 
distinction to be made between categories b) and e), as they are both 
termed "Comuneros", i.e. members of peasant communities. Most observers 
(Matos Mar, Kay, Caballero) indicate that the vast majority of "Comunero" 
beneficiaries belong to our category e), and did not receive any land; 
hence, the average area obtained by those "Comuneros" who did receive land 
(category b) is well above 0.4 ha, possibly 2-3 ha, when standardized. 
Table 9. Families who benefitted from the reform, by category and 
region (x 1000), average area allocated. 
Costa 
Permanent workers 80.3 
"Individuales" 16.4 
"Colonos" 6.0 
"Comuneros" 14.4 
Total 117.1 
ra + Selva 
16.8 
17.3 
84.9 
123.5 
242.5 
Peru 
family 
number 
97.1 
33.7 
90.9 
137.9 
359.6 
% 
27.0 
9.4 
25.3 
38.3 
100.0 
Stand.ha/ 
3.8 
2.6 
2.1 
0.4 
2.0 
3.20 If one excludes beneficiaries of category e), estimating that they 
number about 100,000, the number of real beneficiaries is in the order of 
260,000 families, i.e. 26% of the total number of agriculture-dependent 
families. In the Costa this proportion may have reached 60-70%, but in the 
Sierra not more than 20%; the number and share of Selva beneficiaries was 
negligible. 
4. Economic effects 
a) Production 
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4.1 One of the objectives of the reform was to bring agricultural 
production out of the stagnation of the previous period. In the first few 
years of the reform the authorities claimed substantial success on this 
score, a claim that subsequent production statistics did not bear out. On 
the other hand, the sharp drop that critics of the reform had predicted did 
not occur either. According to figures of the Ministry of Agriculture for 
the period 1970-1979, production grew by 0.5% p.a., roughly as in the 
preceding five years, when there was much restiveness about the anticipated 
reform. In the previous 20 years, up to 1964, production had grown on 
average by 3.5% p.a. Can this near-stagnation be attributed to the reform? 
4.2 It is more likely that the main culprit was the cheap-food policy that 
was introduced in the early 1960s, and that became even more adverse to 
production at the time of the reform, when private trade was supplanted by 
state trade organizations for major products and there was a pervasive 
control system in several spheres, including cultivation. A typical example 
was the decree, issued in 1972, that every farm had to devote 40% of its 
area to food crops ; one of the results was that cotton production in the 
northern Costa was reduced, and that the nearby Sierra region of Cajamarea, 
which had hitherto supplied the northern Costa with food, lost its market. 
4.3 In addition, the early years of the reform era were characterized by 
policies that conflicted with the social objectives the government claimed 
to pursue : prices of the few commodities produced for the market by small 
Sierra producers (wheat, milk, beef), mainly destined to the high income 
urban population, were kept artificially low by food aid (wheat), 
low-priced EEC dairy products, and import subsidization (beef). At the same 
time, staple foods (beans, maize) for the low-income consumers, produced by 
middle-income coastal producers, were subject to relative price increases. 
4.4 Production performance on the redistributed lands was mixed. In the 
collective sector (accounting for nearly one-quarter of total production in 
1977) as a whole, production remained initially at pre-reform levels, 
possibly thanks to the attention the authorities devoted to this sector in 
the form of credit (higher subsidy on interest rates), input supply, 
management training. Within the collective sector two types of farms fared 
well in the early years : 
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- The country's 15 sugar estates had not suffered from any pre-reform 
decapitalization, because they were specifically excluded under the 1964 
law; they were expropriated overnight when the 1969 law was 
issued, and turned into CAPs. Despite occasional shifts in management, 
production values showed initially increases thanks to a favourable price 
development on the export market. 
- Those SAISs involved in sheep rearing were able to quickly restore their 
flocks to the pre-decapitalization levels of the early 1960s. 
4.5 Production in the non-sugar CAPs and the mixed crop/livestock SAISs 
initially showed a less favourable picture. 
As most of the non-sugar CAPs were created by grouping a number of smaller 
entreprises, there was no tradition of central management, as there was in 
the sugar estates. The lack of coherence, moreover, caused frequent 
conflicts between the various groups of owners/workers. The problems in the 
mixed SAISs were several. Firstly, pre-reform decapitalization had taken on 
greater proportions than in the generally larger and better managed 
livestock estates. In addition, there were internal pressures caused by the 
desire of former "colonos" to keep or enlarge their individual plots; and 
external pressures from the surrounding communities in the form of 
encroachment on the land of the central production unit, disappointed as 
they were by the meagre surpluses generated by the central unit. 
4.6 By the mid 1970s the above picture tends to be reversed. The sugar CAPs 
are confronted by sharply dropping prices, and in addition they become the 
scene of two types of conflict, one between owners/workers and outside 
labour, the other between the State and the CAPs. Initial claims for 
membership by seasonal workers (mainly cane-cutters from the Sierra) had 
been successfully refuted by making them redundant, for example through 
investment in cane-cutting machines; but over time, as owners/workers 
tended to reduce their working hours and to acquire an individual plot on 
the estate, outside labour was recruited again, but at lower remuneration 
than previously. Eventually, this outside labour worked more hours than the 
CAP-members, but received less salary. This development and the 
accompanying absence of further investments in expansion and replacement, 
brought along intervention by the State, in the form of a gradual taking 
over of management. 
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4.7 In the non-sugar CAPs, the forces of disintegration into smaller units 
had first met with strong government resistance; only a limited number of 
CAPs had been allowed to split up into smaller cooperatives, in a few cases 
down to the legal minimum of 15 members, but never into individual 
holdings. With the change of government in 1976 these desires were no 
longer frowned upon, and this had a beneficial effect on production. A 
similar trend could be observed in the smaller SAISs. The large livestock 
SAISs in general maintained the production levels they had reached shortly 
after the reform. 
4.8 A comparison made in 1980 by Bolhuis between crop yields in the 
collective farms and in individually-owned farms showed that, on average, 
the coastal collective farms obtained yields that were 7% lower than those 
obtained by small individual farms, and as much as 23% lower than those of 
middle-sized farms. For only 38% of the more than 100 different crops 
studied, the associative entreprises came out highest. A similar comparison 
for the Sierra showed no significant differences. As indicated earlier, at 
the time of the survey part of the initially collective sector had already 
been privatized; so the yield differences observed cannot strictly speaking 
be interpreted as differences between redistributed and untouched lands. 
Further, it is conceivable that in the pre-reform situation the enterprises 
that were now collective also experienced lower yields. Most observers 
agree, however, that there has been a relative decline in performance by 
the coastal CAPs, which may explain partly the long-term stagnation in 
agricultural output. How much? 
On the basis of a) the yield differences observed above, and b) the share 
of coastal CAPs in the country's agricultural production (15-20%), and 
assuming that the enterprises now incorporated in these CAPs would 
otherwise have experienced yields similar to those of the middle-sized 
individually-owned farms, the reform in the Costa would only have depressed 
the country's total production by some 4%. Part of this "damage" was 
probably neutralized in the Sierra, where low-yielding pastures were turned 
into cropland (see paragraph 4.10). 
b) Employment 
4.9 Creating employment was not explicitly stated as an objective at the 
outset of the reform. But implicitly it was expected that employment 
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possibilities would be generated, at least in the SAISs, through a process 
of intensification and the resulting need for additional labour to be 
recruited in the surrounding communities. But the opposite happened. Like 
the new owners of the sugar CAPs, the permanent workers of the central 
production units, in an attempt to raise their remuneration, reduced the 
number of non-permanent workers. As mentioned earlier, this tendency was 
later reversed in the sugar CAPs, when the owners/workers hired outside 
labour to perform their tasks in the CAPs. It is not known to what extent 
this latter tendency off-set the earlier one, or if a similar phenomenon 
took place in the SAISs. 
4.10 Most observers (for example Kay and Caballero) believe that the 
overall impact on exployment has been nil. I believe, however, that it has 
been positive, viz. on lands that were previously used as pasture and then 
assigned to, or forcibly acquired by, communities and turned into cropland. 
To be sure, not all land in this category of about 800,000 ha 
(unstandardized), or 50,000 ha (standardized) could be turned into 
cropland; but wherever possible, this was done, because of the great 
pressure on land in the communities. I observed an example of this change 
in use in the huge CAP Tupac Amaru II near Cuzco. This CAP (a misnomer 
because it had the stucture of a SAIS) was invaded and absorbed by the 
surrounding communities as from 1976, and as a result at least half of the 
former pasture land was turned into cropland; labour input on this land was 
10-15 times as high as before. Change of land use has also been reported in 
other cases of land acquired by communities. The overall effect of this 
reform-induced intensification is not known; but it may well explain the 
statistic that between 1969 and 1978 agricultural employment rose by 0.9% 
p.a., as against only 0.3% p.a. in the previous period. 
4.11 In the later years of the reform the authorities showed some concern 
for the employment aspect, and a decree-law issued in 1975 required every 
farm of 9 ha or more to hire one permanent labourer for each 5 ha of 
irrigated land. According to Figueroa (1976), this could have meant some 
120,000 additional permanent labourers, but in my opinion at the expense of 
an equal number of seasonal labourers. However, the law was not put into 
effect by the new military government that came to power in 1976. 
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c) Income distribution 
4.12 The change in ownership of land entailed a redistribution of national 
wealth and income. Most of the compensation for expropriated land (which 
was well below its productive value) was in bonds that rapidly lost their 
value because of high and accelerating inflation. Between 1975 and 1985 the 
free market dollar exchange rate moved from 43 Soles to 16,000 Soles! On 
the other hand, payments by the beneficiaries were only a small fraction of 
what was due, until in 1975 the agrarian debt was officially cancelled. As 
the former owners invariably belonged to higher income groups than the 
beneficiaries this redistribution had an equalizing effect. How large was 
it? 
4.13 Prior to the reform overall distribution of personal income in the 
country was as follows (1961): 
Lowest 10% 1.0% 
Second 10% 1.5% 
Third 10% 2.2% 
Fourth 10% 3.3% 
Fifth 10% 4.3% 
Sixth 10% 5.9% 
Seventh 10% 7.6% 
Eighth 10% 9.8% 
Ninth 10% 15.2% 
Highest 10% 49.2% 
Gini-ratio: 0.6 
Source: R.Webb et al.. 1975 
From additional data on regional and rural/urban distribution can be 
inferred what from simple observation was obvious, viz. that the rural 
population of the Sierra was at the bottom end of the scale. The ratio 
between rural and urban incomes was 1:4.2 (in 1971; World Bank 1981), while 
that between average incomes in the Costa and Selva on the one hand, and 
those in the Sierra on the other was 1:1.9 (1961; R.Webb). 
4.14 No data are available on income distribution within the farm sector 
But from the regional data in chapter 2 on land availability (in 
standardized terms) and numbers of farm families, the approximate ratios of 
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average farm income in the Sierra, Selva and Costa respectively, would be 
1.0:1.8:6.3. 
Further differentiation within each region would give a still clearer 
picture. Suffice it to say that according to all observers (including the 
author) the lowest income groups in the Costa (the estate workers) lived 
under far better conditions than the vast majority of the Sierra farm 
families (colonos and comuneros). 
4.15 The magnitude of the reform-induced income distribution is estimated 
by Caballero and Alvarez (1978) at about one per cent of national income. 
They arrive at this estimate by assuming that one- third of agricultural 
GDP consists of return on fixed assets; by applying this to the proportion 
of redistributed land and other assets (29%, which is lower than my 
estimate), they arrive at 9.5% of agricultural GDP; in 1979, when the 
reform was terminated, agricultural GDP was 10.1% of total GDP and 13.3% of 
national income (World Bank, 1981). Using my own estimate of redistributed 
land (38%, in standardized hectares, cf. Table 7), and following the same 
procedure, we would arrive at a redistribution of 1.7% of 1979 national 
income. 
4.16 An alternative calculation would go as follows: from a 1973 interim 
survey of the reform (Horton, 1974) it appears that the compensation paid 
for expropriated assets was, on average, Soles 20,000 (or US $ 500 in 1973) 
per hectare of irrigated land. The productive value was about four times as 
high. So, if one uses the conversion factors of para. 2.7, the reform 
redistributed some Soles 56 billion (US $ 1.4 billion at the 1973 exchange 
rate) of national wealth. If one further assumes a reasonable return on 
this redistributed value of, say, 5%, one arrives at a yearly income of 
Soles 2.8 billion, which represented just over one per cent of national 
income in the mid-1970s. 
4.17 While a global one per cent may be considered a low impact for a 
measure that stirred so much hope, emotion and foreign interest, it may 
well have been a substantial income increase for the invididual 
beneficiaries. Indeed, it was. The redistributed Soles 2.8 billion was 
transferred to about 260,000 real beneficiaries, i.e. on average Soles 
11,000 (or US $ 270). Compared with an estimated average income per farm 
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family of Soles 36,000 or US $ 900 (author's estimate for the average of 
1970-75), this is an increment of some 30%. 
4.18 This average conceals wide variations: from 1973 figures on the 
official value of transferred land and other assets (as reported by Horton, 
1974) it can be estimated that a typical coastal beneficiary would have 
received a value, and thus presumably an additional income, eight times as 
high as a typical beneficiary in the Sierra. There is no reason to suppose 
that these proportions were different in the later years of the reform. As 
this ratio roughly correponds with that between Costa and Sierra farm 
incomes (cf. paragraph 4.14), the redistribution maintained the relative 
income positions within the group of beneficiaries, while increasing the 
gaps in absolute income. 
4.19 Could the redistribution haven been more equitable? In theory, yes. A 
more evenly spread result could have been obtained by allowing Sierra farm 
families to share in the redistribution of coastal farm land. This would 
have required a much more radical reform, in the sense of a much lower 
ceiling for ownership of coastal land, or at least by packing the 
cooperatives with additional labour (as happened in Tunisia when 
expropriated farms were turned into production cooperatives). The 
underlying idea of the reform was, however, to distribute land to those 
already on it (the hired workers, tenants and "colonos"), or near it (the 
communities). To our knowledge, organized migration was never even 
considered. It would have been politically unacceptable, in particular to 
the trade unions of coastal farm workers, whose support the authorities 
were wooing. Obviously, by doing things the way they did, the authorities 
did not prevent the rural Sierra population from migrating; but instead of 
going to coastal farm land, the migrants settled in coastal cities. 
d) Government finances 
4.20 The impact of the reform on the Treasury was three-fold: firstly the 
compensation to be paid to expropriated owners, secondly the payments to be 
received from beneficiaries, and thirdly the administrative expenses of the 
reform. As reported in Chapter 3, the financial compensation landowners 
received was limited in two ways: 
- Total compensation for land was based on self-assessed values in the 1968 
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returns of a newly established land tax, and these values were on average 
well below the productive value of the land. 
- Of that compensation only a small part was paid in cash, and the 
remainder in low-yielding and long-maturing bonds that were not protected 
against inflation. 
In addition there were cash payments for livestock and other assets; in 
total, cash payments were about 20% of total nominal compensation. 
4.21 The beneficiaries incurred a debt (at 2-4% interest on land and 7% on 
other assets) to the amount of the expropriated value. This debt, which had 
a 3-year period of grace, had to be repaid in 20 annual instalments. When 
in the mid-1970s the biggest debtors, the sugar CAPs, came into financial 
straits, all outstanding debts were suspended; in 1979 the total agrarian 
debt was cancelled. By that time some Soles 2.4 billion had been repaid, 
less than 20% of the total amount due. 
4.22 No records of the full administrative costs of the reform exist. The 
few available figures refer to direct costs incurred by the Ministry of 
Agriculture but not to those spent by other institutions especially set up 
for the reform: the National Training Centre for Land Reform (CENCIRA), and 
the Social Mobilization System (SINAMOS). Both organizations employed 
hundreds of staff during the several years of their existence. 
4.23 At the end of the first four years of the reform, when roughly half of 
the land eventually to be transferred had been expropriated, the official 
costs of the reform were estimated at nearly Soles 12 billion, at that time 
US $ 300 m. But over two-thirds of this was in bonds, which, because of 
accelerating inflation, had little consequence for the Treasury in the 
following years. Of the remaining Soles 4 billion or US $ 100 m., 30% were 
interest payments on bonds, 45% were cash payments for cattle and other 
assets, and 25% administrative costs of the Ministry of Agriculture 
(estimates by author). All in all, total outlay by the Government for the 
entire programme, minus repayments by beneficiaries, has not exceeded US $ 
200 m. or 1973 Soles 8 billion during the eight-year period 1969-1976. This 
would correspond to about 2% of total government expenditure in that 
period. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
5.1 Land reform dominated the Peruvian agricultural scene in the period 
1969-1976. After a period characterized by land invasions, peasant revolts, 
stagnating production and a lukewarm attempt to introduce a reform, a 
military government - with, for Latin America, unusual political features -
conceived and carried out a radical and massive transfer of land ownership. 
Nearly 40% of land, cattle and other assets, belonging to some 6,000 
private and corporate estates, were transferred to about 260,000 
beneficiaries, i.e. a quarter of Peru's agriculture-dependent families. 
Virtually all of the new owners were people already working on the land 
they received, be it as permanent labourer, "colonos", tenant or 
sharecropper. Three quarters of the transferred land was to be farmed 
collectively, in newly established entreprises of various types; the 
remainder was allotted to individuals. 
5.2 The reform did not cause a significant drop in output, though the 
initial tensions in and around the collective entreprises certainly did not 
help to give a new impetus to production. However, pervasive state 
intervention in marketing and an urban-biased price policy were the 
principal causes of continued stagnation. Against temporary losses in 
employment on the coastal sugar estates stand some gains in the Sierra, 
when transferred pastures could be put to use as cropland. In the period 
after 1969 total agricultural employment rose by an average of 0.6% p.a. 
5.3 The nationwide effect on income distribution, which, as in most Latin 
American countries is extremely uneven, was minor: it took away one to two 
per cent of national income from the highest income group, and shifted most 
of it to income groups that by no means belonged to the bottom category, 
the coastal estate workers. Only a small part of the benefits of the reform 
went to a minority of the poorest category of the population, the Sierra 
subs i s tenc e farme r s. 
5.4 Compensation to owners was based on values well below productive values 
of expropriated assets. And only 20% was paid in cash, with the remainder 
in bonds that rapidly became worthless. Even though payments by 
beneficiaries were soon suspended, the reform's financial consequences for 
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the state were small and were much smaller than the funds spent on some 
prestigious but low-yielding coastal irrigation projects. 
5.5 Finally, the reform was not -and did not mean to be- egalitarian in the 
sense of reducing the inequality in living standards between the farm 
population of the Costa and the Sierra, because it did not, or could not, 
allow any migration of beneficiaries from the Sierra to the Costa. It 
became, therefore, principally an intra-coastal affair, affecting 60-70% of 
farmers and over half of farm land. As for the Sierra, the discrepancy 
between the limited resources conceivably available for redistribution and 
the huge number of farm families living at or near subsistence level was 
too large for the reform to be even a temporary and partial palliative for 
a continued exodus to coastal cities. More, but not sufficient, could have 
been expected from a concentrated effort to intensify production. 
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